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Contributory Liability Under the
ACPA: A More Effective Approach to
Deterring Cybersquatting at Its
Source
Andrew J. Piombino
INTRODUCTION

The issue of contributory cybersquatting arises from the
enactment of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(ACPA) in 1999, which created a cause of action for registering,
trafficking in, or using an internet domain name confusingly
similar to, or dilutive of, a trademark or personal name.1 The
statute was enacted primarily to combat those who register
domain names with the intent to hold them, and later sell them,
at a premium to those who would actually make use of the domain
name.2 The statute permits a trademark owner to bring an action
against a person who, with a bad faith intent to profit from a
mark, registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that is
confusingly similar to the protected mark.3 The statute also lays
out several factors for determining whether there is bad faith, and
creates an in rem civil action against the domain name.4 Since its
inception, the statute has been used as a tool to take action
against those who make a business out of ransoming domain
names by buying them, running skeleton websites and demanding
large buyout costs from those who own trademarks in the subject

1.
2.
3.
4.

15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254).
S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4 (1999).
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (Westlaw).
Id.
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of the domain name and seek to run a legitimate website.5 It has
only in a few instances, however, been used to demand relief from
those large domain registrars that passively support
cybersquatting activity.6
Since the creation of the statute, several plaintiffs have
attempted to extend the reach of the statute by suing domain
registrars and hosting services for catering to cybersquatters.7
Several district courts have weighed in on the issue with varying
results, but only one case has made it to a United States appeals
court.8 That case, Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. GoDaddy.com,
Inc., was a Ninth Circuit case that came down in December 2013.9
There, a Malaysian petroleum company, known colloquially as
“Petronas,” sued GoDaddy for registering and providing
forwarding services to a cybersquatter using the name
www.petronastowers.com, even after Petronas requested that
GoDaddy take down the domain name.10 The Ninth Circuit
declined to create and apply an action for contributory
cybersquatting against GoDaddy, offering several rationales:
(1) the text of the Act does not apply to the conduct that
would be actionable under such a theory; (2) Congress did
not intend to implicitly include common law doctrines
applicable to trademark infringement because the ACPA
created a new cause of action that is distinct from
traditional trademark remedies; and (3) allowing suits
against registrars for contributory cybersquatting would
not advance the goals of the statute.11
5. Christine A. Walczak, The New and Evolving Tort of Contributory
Cybersquatting: Did the Courts Get It Right?, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y
531, 535 (2012).
6. See, e.g., Acad. of Motion Pictures Arts & Scis. v. GoDaddy.com, Inc.,
No. CV 10-03738, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120871, at *66-67 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
10, 2015) (discussing whether GoDaddy acted with the requisite bad faith
intent to find the company liable under the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act); Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Above.com Pty, Ltd., 881 F. Supp. 2d
1173, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (concluding that contributory liability exists
under the ACPA).
7. See, e.g., Acad. of Motion Pictures Arts & Scis., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
120871, at *66-67; Verizon Cal., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
8. See Petroliam Nasional Berhad, (Petronas) v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 737
F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2013).
9. Id. at 546.
10. Id. at 548.
11. Id. at 550.
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Implicit in this reasoning was a concern that registrars might
be overburdened and more restricted in issuing new domain
names if they had to divine the intent of those seeking to register
domain names.12 Further, the court, and many supporters of
registrars think that the mechanisms in place for in rem suits and
arbitration under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy (UDRP) are more than sufficient to combat the problem.13
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in October
2014, likely due in large part to the lack of a circuit split, as only
one appeals court had ruled on the issue.14
This note will argue that Petronas was decided incorrectly,
and that the intent, language, and policy behind the ACPA
implicitly creates an action for contributory cybersquatting
against domain name registrars and hosting services that is
necessary to protect the rights of trademark owners and beneficial
for the streamlining of domain name disputes. Part I will provide
an overview of the pervasive problem of cybersquatting, the
response of Congress enacting the ACPA, and ACPA’s effects on
cybersquatting activities. It will address the statute’s failure to
speedily and properly protect trademark owners from
cybersquatting as it is currently interpreted. Additionally, it will
illustrate how those failures play out in the context of the
Petronas case. Part II will argue that the history and nature of
the ACPA implicitly creates an action for contributory
cybersquatting by illustrating the history behind the act,
comparing the addition of the ACPA to codification of trademark
infringement as a whole, which allows for contributory liability
under common law principles. Part III will argue that the goals of
the ACPA support an action for contributory liability based on the
statutory construction, the legislative history, and the goals
driving the act. It will refute the policy arguments concerning an
overly burdensome system for domain name registrars if they are
required to divine the intent of potential domain owners, and the
concern for rejection of domain registration for those who may not
be acting in bad faith. Lastly, it will argue that the interests of
trademark owners are not adequately protected by in rem
provisions where damages are necessary to make them whole, and
12.
13.
14.

See id. at 553.
Id. at 554.
Id. at 546, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 55 (2014).
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that creating the action will incentivize domain name registrars to
eliminate cybersquatters without the need for litigation. Finally,
Part IV will conclude that the Supreme Court should take up this
issue, and allow for an action for contributory cybersquatting for
the protection of trademark owners and for purposes of expediency
in resolving cybersquatting issues. It will propose that the
Supreme Court might limit contributory liability by creating a
more robust interpretation of the bad faith standard.
I.

THE ELUSIVE PROBLEMS OF CYBERSQUATTING

Cybersquatting is a term that encompasses a series of
practices plaguing trademark owners in the internet age, and that
continues to threaten to hijack and undermine the goodwill of
trademark owners, and in some cases even to extort them.15 The
most common, and perhaps the earliest form, is the traditional
cybersquatter, a person who registers a domain name including a
well-known trademark for the purpose of selling the name to the
trademark owner, often at an exorbitant price.16 Other practices
that are subsumed under the title of cybersquatting include
“typosquatting,” whereby a person registers misspellings of a
trademark as a domain name in order to direct those who misspell
a domain name to a different website, and “cyberpirating,” where
a person uses the goodwill of the trademark to lure web users to a
site, either by having it redirect to a different site, or merely
connecting ad revenue from visitors to a fake one.17 Given the
range of damage these different types of cybersquatting can cause
based on their unique functions, the threat to a trademark holder
is often far greater than the loss of money from being forced to
buyout a cybersquatter, and can include tarnishment of the
trademark and lost business opportunities.18
At the time of the enactment of the ACPA on November 29,
1999, it was clear that the mechanisms by which courts had dealt
with cybersquatting activity up to that point were not sufficient,
15. See Robert L. Mitchell, How Cybersquatters Tarnish Brand Names,
PC WORLD (Sept. 8, 2009, 1:47 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/
171601/how_cybersquatters_tarnish_brand_names.html.
16. See Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (N.D. Ill.
1996).
17. Tenesa S. Scaturro, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
and the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy the First Decade:
Looking Back and Adapting Forward, 11 NEV. L.J. 877, 880 (2011).
18. Id. at 885; see also Mitchell, supra note 15.
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since cybersquatters had become increasingly sophisticated in
navigating loopholes in trademark infringement and dilution
statutes, and because remedies under those statutes were
uncertain and often very expensive to prosecute.19 The ACPA was
created as a response, with the intention that it would close those
loopholes by creating a more narrowly tailored statute which
protects trademark owners from many types of cybersquatting
uses by removing the “commercial use” requirement under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FDTA), while also creating a
counterbalance by requiring bad faith in the alleged
cybersquatter.20 While the statute effectively addressed many of
the concerns of the legislature at the time, it has been decidedly
lacking in its ability to address the complicity of domain name
registrars, who profit from registrations, and often hold the keys
to speedy relief for trademark holders.21 Domain name registrars
are organizations that have been accredited by the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) or a
national country code top-level domain (TLD) (such as .uk or .ca)
to register domain names.22 These companies sell domain names
to the public, and act as a liaison between the consumer and
domain registries such as VeriSign, which manages the

19. Scaturro, supra note 17, at 883.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) provides, in relevant part:
(1)(A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a
mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark under
this section, if, without regard to the goods or services of the parties,
that person–
(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a
personal name which is protected as a mark under this section; and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that –
(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly
similar to that mark;
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly
similar to or dilutive of that mark; or
(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason
of section 706 of Title 18 or section 220506 of Title 36.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (Westlaw).
21. See id.
22. GODADDY,
https://www.godaddy.com/help/what-is-the-differencebet
ween-a-registry-registrar-and-registrant-8039 (last visited Aug. 31, 2016).
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registration of .com domain names.23 Often, registrars such as
GoDaddy.com also offer hosting and forwarding services, whereby
they can provide servers to host a registrant’s website, or cause
the domain name to forward web users to a different domain name
that the registrant owns.24 Registrars, by their many functions,
exercise a great deal of power over the registration and
maintenance of domains. For that reason, many domain holders
seek relief from domain registrars in attempting to attain a
speedy resolution for cybersquatting claims.25 This is particularly
true where domain name holders are difficult to find, procedurally
difficult to sue, or nonresponsive to attempted communications
regarding the alleged cybersquatting.26 Unfortunately, both the
ACPA and the UDRP provide potential hurdles to those who seek
relief from domain name registrars.27
An apt illustration of this issue playing out is in Petronas,
where a cybersquatter used GoDaddy.com as its registrar.28 In
2007, a third party who had registered the names
petronastower.net and petronastowers.net transferred its
registration service to GoDaddy.29
Using GoDaddy’s name
forwarding service, the third party directed web traffic from those
domain names to an adult website called camfunchat.com.30 In
2009, Petronas officials contacted GoDaddy and requested that it
“take action against the website associated with the
‘petronastower.net’ domain name.”31 GoDaddy conducted an
investigation, but refused to take action on what was a clear
cybersquatting violation because it did not host the site, and
because it claimed it was prevented under the UDRP from
participating in trademark disputes regarding domain name

23. Id.
24. See Petroliam Nasional Berhad, (Petronas) v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 737
F.3d 546, 548 (9th Cir. 2013).
25. See id.
26. See id. at 554.
27. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254);
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, INTERNET CORPORATION
FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (ICANN), https://www.icann.org/
resources/ pages/policy-2012-02-25-en (last visited Aug. 31, 2016); Scaturro,
supra note 17, at 899.
28. 737 F.3d at 548.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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ownership.32 In spite of almost certain violations of the standards
of the ACPA and the similar standards of the UDRP, GoDaddy did
nothing. In response, Petronas sued, attempting to persuade the
court to read a cause of action for contributory cybersquatting into
the ACPA.33 Despite the existence of persuasive case law in the
California District Courts supporting claims for contributory
cybersquatting, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that:
(1) the text of the Act does not apply to the conduct that
would be actionable under such a theory; (2) Congress did
not intend to implicitly include common law doctrines
applicable to trademark infringement because the ACPA
created a new cause of action that is distinct from
traditional trademark remedies; and (3) allowing suits
against registrars for contributory cybersquatting would
not advance the goals of the statute.34
For the reasons stated below however, it is clear that the
court’s analysis is not supported by analogies to the creation of
contributory liability actions in trademark infringement, the
legislative history, the statutory construction, or the policies that
drive the statute.
II. THE HISTORY AND NATURE OF THE ACPA IMPLICITLY CREATES AN
ACTION FOR CONTRIBUTORY CYBERSQUATTING

Several district courts had considered the issue of whether an
action for contributory cybersquatting existed, and many had
32. See id. The UDRP is an alternative dispute resolution process that
was adopted by ICANN in 1999. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy, INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (ICANN),
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-2012-02-25-en (last visited Aug.
31, 2016). It establishes by mandatory contractual obligation, an expedited
and inexpensive arbitration process for resolving cybersquatting claims. Id.
It also provides that registrars need only intervene in a cybersquatting
dispute upon order of a court or an arbitration decision. Id. While certainly
more efficient than a lawsuit against a cybersquatter under the ACPA, a
UDRP arbitration action can take 50-60 days to resolve, a period during
which the infringing website remains up and running. Id.; see also Charles
Runyan, 6 Ways to Recover a Domain Name from an Infringing
Cybersquatter,
DOMAINSHERPA
(last
updated
Dec.
9,
2015),
http://www.domainsherpa.com/6-ways-to-recover-a-domain-name-from-an-inf
ringing-cybersquatter/. For many trademark holders, even such a short
period of time can inflict irreparable damage to their mark.
33. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 549-50.
34. Id. at 550.
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answered in the affirmative.35 Those courts that have applied
contributory liability have relied on an analogy to Inwood Labs,
Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., a 1982 Supreme Court case that created an
action for secondary liability for trademark infringement under
the Lanham Act.36 There, the Court considered the statute as
legislated against the backdrop of common law tort liability rules,
taking into account those tort principles as applied to trademark
dilution actions at common law.37 It reasoned that the legislature
intended to incorporate those common law principles into the
statute, despite the fact that neither the statute, nor the
legislative history suggested that such common law principles
were a consideration.38
In spite of that decision, and the fact that the ACPA was
created as a part of the Lanham Act, under the same umbrella of
trademark protection, the Petronas Court dismissed the ACPA as
creating a new and distinct cause of action that should not be
afforded the same incorporation of broad common law tort
principles.39 In doing so, the court ignored the principle that
“[s]tatutes which invade the common law . . . are to be read with a
presumption favoring the retention of long-established and
familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the
contrary is evident.”40 Instead, the court contrasted the ACPA
from the Lanham Act as a whole, reasoning that, prior to the
enactment of the Lanham Act, the Supreme Court had recognized
35. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Sols., Inc., 194 F.3d 980,
983 (9th Cir. 1999); Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Above.com Pty, Ltd., 881 F. Supp. 2d
1173, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Solid Host, NL v. NameCheap, Inc., 652 F. Supp.
2d 1092, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com, Inc.,
177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 646 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
36. 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982) (“[I]f a manufacturer or distributor
intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to
supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in
trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorily
responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.”). The Lanham Act
codified the trademark laws that existed at its time of passing in 1946. It has
then since been amended by the ACPA to add new cybersquatting causes of
action. See Petronas, 737 F.3d at 549.
37. Inwood Labs, 456 U.S. at 854. See also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280,
285 (2002) (“[W]hen Congress creates a tort action, it legislates against a
legal background of ordinary tort-related vicarious liability rules and
consequently intends its legislation to incorporate those rules.”).
38. Inwood Labs, 456 U.S. at 854.
39. 737 F.3d 546, 553 (9th Cir. 2013).
40. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993).

2017]

CONTRIBUTORY CYBERSQUATTING

335

a common law theory of contributory liability into the law of
trademarks and unfair competition.41
Conversely, no such
common law theory had been recognized for cybersquatting.42
Since cybersquatting was considered a new and distinct action,
the court reasoned that it should not receive the benefits of
common law contributory liability.43 Further, the court reasoned
that since the ACPA and trademark infringement bear distinct
elements—namely that trademark infringement requires
commercial use by the alleged infringer, while the ACPA does not,
and that the ACPA requires bad faith, while trademark
infringement does not—the statutes create different rights, and
thus are not entitled to the same common law incorporation.44
This narrow view, however, does not consider the fact that, as
mentioned above, prior to the enactment of the ACPA,
cybersquatting type claims were litigated under traditional
trademark infringement and anti-dilution claims.45 Although no
cases expressly apply or even allege contributory liability under
those circumstances, presumably given the fulfillment of the
elements of an infringement or unfair competition claim, a court
would have applied contributory liability under that statute.46
Indeed, even the Petronas Court concedes that “trademark holders
may still bring claims for traditional direct or contributory
trademark infringement that arises from cybersquatting
activities” under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(3).47 That the legislature
sought to create a more narrowly tailored law, while intentionally
placing it within the Lanham Act, which until the enactment of
the ACPA was implied to have incorporated contributory claims in
its entirety, should not preclude it from receiving the benefits of
broad tort theories of contributory liability.48 Moreover, the fact
that the cybersquatting action did not exist during the time that
the common law underlying the Lanham Act was developing does
not preclude it from adopting those basic principles that underlie

41. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 552.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 552–53.
45. Scaturro, supra note 17, at 883.
46. See Petronas, 737 F.3d at 552.
47. Id. at 554 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(3)).
48. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982); S.
REP. NO. 106-140, at 1 (1999).
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the act as a whole. Clearly, the legislature could have thought that
the ACPA was sufficiently similar to the rest of the Lanham Act to
be subsumed as an amendment within it, rather than being
created as a separate statutory section, and thus it is reasonably
inferred that it meant for the same underlying tort principles to
apply.49 Furthermore, the distinction, which is based on differing
elements, is far too narrow and arbitrary a distinction,
particularly because the discrete requirements of infringement
claims and defenses under the Lanham Act do not mirror their
common law predecessors exactly, but are still afforded the
implication of contributory liability.50
The Ninth Circuit also concludes that the plain language of
the ACPA precludes a cause of action for contributory
cybersquatting.51 The court begins by invoking the canon of
statutory interpretation, which requires the court to “presume
that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means
in a statute what it says there.”52 The court reasoned that by
employing the language to impose liability on those that “‘register
[ ], traffic[ ] in, or use[ ] a domain name’ with the ‘bad faith intent
to profit’ from that protected mark,”53 the plain language limits
the circumstances under which one can be found liable for
cybersquatting to those who directly commit these acts, as
opposed to one who aids and abets them.54 The court took issue
with extending liability to include merely complicit registrars,
whose acts were unmotivated by a bad faith intent to profit, as
opposed to direct cybersquatters who demonstrated bad faith
intent.55
On its face, this does appear to be a problem. However,
looking to interpretations of contributory liability for trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act and adapting them in light of
the bad faith requirement, the language can be reconciled. In the
same way that there is no express provision in the plain language
49. See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 1–4 (1999) (modernizing sections of the
Lanham Act by including online intellectual property, such as domains, into
the statutory framework).
50. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–254).
51. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 550.
52. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).
53. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 550 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i)–(ii))
(alteration in original).
54. Id. at 550–51.
55. Id.

2017]

CONTRIBUTORY CYBERSQUATTING

337

of the ACPA for contributory liability, there is also no such
language in the Lanham Act relating to infringement.56 Despite
the lack of direct language, the Inwood Court imported common
law principles in determining that the contributor is liable: (1)
when he “intentionally induces another to infringe on a
trademark,” or (2) when he “continues to supply its product to one
whom [he] knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark
infringement . . . .”57 In order to avoid an overextension of
contributory liability in light of the language of the statute,
subsequent courts refined the test, particularly in Lockheed
Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., which held that a
defendant can be held contributorily liable only if he created a
marketplace wherein infringement was occurring and he exercised
a sufficient degree of control and monitoring over the infringer’s
means of infringement.58 In doing so, the court was able to import
the common law tort theory into the statute, while crafting it in
such a way as to avoid contradicting the statute, by including only
language that almost equates to a participation in the
infringement.59
District courts have employed the same method to formulate
an action for contributory cybersquatting.60 In Ford Motor Co. v.
GreatDomains.com, Inc., the court determined that a plaintiff
could establish a cause of action under the necessary marketplace
analysis, but found that the plaintiffs in that case did not meet the
high threshold set forth by the bad faith requirement.61 In
importing bad faith into a contributory liability context, the court
added that the “plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the
‘cyber-landlord’ knew or should have known that its vendors had
no legitimate reason for having registered the disputed domain
names in the first place.”62 The court also considered whether the
contributor profited off of the use of the marketplace for

56. See generally 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114254).
57. 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
58. 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999). This analysis is often referred to
as the “necessary market analysis.”
59. See id.
60. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d
635, 646–47 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
61. Id. at 647.
62. Id.
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cybersquatting purposes.63 This high bar ensured that the plain
language of the statute remained in force, while incorporating
common law tort liability principles.
In spite of the practical and flexible interpretations offered by
California district courts, the Ninth Circuit instead chooses to
adopt an intensely narrow analysis, focusing merely on the
absence of express language in the statute pointing to
contributory liability.64 In doing so, it removes the ACPA from its
statutory and common law context, considering it in isolation
based merely on a limited and shortsighted construction of the
language of the statute. Were the same analysis applied with
regard to the rest of the Lanham Act, the well settled proposition
that contributory liability applies in trademark infringement suits
would be entirely undermined, as it similarly lacks express
language regarding contributory liability.65 It does not make
sense that a mere variation of the same statutory section would be
subject to a different type of language analysis, especially where
an application of the same analysis yields a result that comports
perfectly well with the language of the statute, given only a slight
variation based on the interpretation of good faith.
III. THE GOALS OF THE ACT SUPPORT AN ACTION FOR CONTRIBUTORY
LIABILITY

The final reason that the Petronas Court offers for not
extending contributory liability to cybersquatting is that creating
such an action does not further the goals of the statute as
articulated by the senate report.66 The court points out that the
statute was enacted “in order to ‘protect consumers . . . and to
provide clarity in the law for trademark owners by prohibiting the
bad-faith and abusive registration of distinctive marks . . . .’”67
63. Id. at 648–49.
64. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 551.
65. See generally 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114254).
66. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 553–54; see S. REP. NO. 106–140, at 4, 7–9
(1999) (the senate report specifically outlines the purpose and analysis of the
statute’s enactment, and notably never raises nor discusses the idea of
contributory liability).
67. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 553 (quoting S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4). “The
purpose of the bill is to protect consumers and American businesses, to
promote the growth of online commerce, and to provide clarity in the law for
trademark owners by prohibiting the bad-faith and abusive registration of
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The court also focuses on the statutory provision which states:
The bill is carefully and narrowly tailored, however, to
extend only to cases where the plaintiff can demonstrate
that the defendant registered, trafficked in, or used the
offending domain name with bad-faith intent to profit
from the goodwill of a mark belonging to someone else.
Thus, the bill does not extend to innocent domain name
registrations by those who are unaware of another’s use
of the name, or even to someone who is aware of the
trademark status of the name but registers a domain
name containing the mark for any reason other than with
bad faith intent to profit from the goodwill associated
with that mark.68
The court construes this purpose as an intention to impose a
strict limitation “on who can be liable for cybersquatting and in
what circumstances.”69 While this may be true, a construction of
the statute which requires the “exceptional circumstances”
contemplated by GreatDomains, creates a similar limitation,
focusing more on the conduct of the defendants rather than their
degree of participation relative to the actual cybersquatting.70
The limitation is assuredly narrow, shielding domain name
registrars who register cybersquatters merely as an oversight,
while really only applying to the types of scenarios where, like in
Petronas, the registrar is informed of a particularly egregious case
of cybersquatting, and the registrar does nothing while it
continues to derive additional revenue from services such as
redirecting and hosting.71 Petronas also alludes to, as other
authors have likewise noted, that there was an additional
Congressional intent to limit the scope of the ACPA so as “to
ensure that any remedies do not impede or stifle the free flow of
information on the Internet.”72
There are several concerns that might be raised. First,
distinctive marks as Internet domain names with the intent to profit from the
goodwill associated with such marks—a practice commonly referred to as
‘cybersquatting.’” S. REP. NO. 106–140, at 4.
68. S. REP. NO. 106–140, at 12–13; see Petronas, 737 F.3d at 553.
69. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 553.
70. Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 647
(E.D. Mich. 2001).
71. See id.; Petronas, 737 F.3d at 548.
72. Walczak, supra note 5, at 556; see Petronas, 737 F.3d at 553–54.
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creating contributory liability might force domain name registrars
to make a determination as to bad faith prior to registering a
domain name, thus slowing down the registration process.73 Next,
registrars might have to monitor domain names more closely,
which is extremely difficult given the number of domains
companies like GoDaddy maintain.74
Finally, “imposing
contributory liability for cybersquatting would incentivize ‘false
positives,’ in which the lawful use of a domain name is restricted
by a risk-averse third party service provider that receives a
seemingly valid take-down request from a trademark holder.”75
While these concerns have a degree of validity to them, it is
important to consider them in practice, and also to consider the
countervailing policy issues that result when the government fails
to hold registrars accountable. First, as mentioned above, under
the type of high bar set forth in GreatDomains, finding
contributory liability would be a rare occurrence, extending to
those circumstances where registrars exercised a degree of control
greater than a mere one-time registration, or where registrars had
actual or constructive knowledge of blatant cybersquatting
activities.76 The statute as interpreted does not target those
innocent parties contemplated by the senate report, and instead
targets those who demonstrate a reckless complicity in
cybersquatting activity.77 Rooting out these types of users is
likely not as difficult as one might think. Dissidents lament that
registrars will be forced to conduct the nine-part test that the
ACPA statute sets out for determining bad faith, which they claim
would be a nearly impossible task.78 However, the statute as
interpreted by the modified necessary market analysis in
GreatDomains does not require such a meticulous review and
monitoring of domains, merely that the registrar take notice of the
activities of domains over which it has a significant degree of
control, and where registrants have no legitimate reason for
73. Walczak, supra note 5, at 556.
74. Id.
75. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 553.
76. Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 647
(E.D. Mich. 2001).
77. See id. at 641–42.
78. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 553. The referenced statute pertains to 15
U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B) and the statute’s non-exhaustive nine-factor test that
the statute lays out to help determine whether a person has acted in bad
faith. Id.
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having registered the disputed domain names to begin with.79
Thus, the registrars would only have to conduct such an analysis
in a limited number of scenarios, such as the one in Petronas,
where GoDaddy provided hosting and forwarding services to the
cybersquatter, the domain name mirrored exactly the
trademarked name of a large corporation, and GoDaddy was
notified of the cybersquatting.80
Whatever inconvenience additional monitoring creates for the
massive companies that register domain names will likely be far
outweighed by the benefit received by trademark holders who
benefit from incentivized registrars that are more proactive about
preventing cybersquatting before it starts.81 Trademark holders
who have clear rights to a domain name will also have the option
to get quick relief from potentially dangerous redirecting or
pirating merely by notifying registrars of potential cybersquatting,
which triggers the duty of the registrars to stamp out egregious
case while not forcing them to preemptively shut down closer calls
and allowing the UDRP provisions to kick in.82 In sum, an
interpretation of the ACPA that creates an action for contributory
liability best serves the policy goals surrounding the intent of the
ACPA by providing more efficient and robust protection of
trademark rights, while setting a high enough bar to prevent
registrars from being forced to slow down the registration process
due to the need to conduct onerous reviews of every domain name
they register.
IV. CONCLUSION

Like the rapid changes that the internet has undergone since
the creation of the ACPA in 1999, the problems arising from
cybersquatting are constantly changing.83 To effectively police
79. See GreatDomains, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 647.
80. See Petronas, 737 F.3d at 548.
81. Contra Walczak, supra note 5, at 556–57 (proposing that the costs
outweigh the benefits of enforcing contributory liability in ACPA cases).
82. But see Petronas, 737 F.3d at 548–49. In Petronas, the court found
secondary liability could not be applied, and thus the registrar could not be
found liable for its mere inaction. Id. The purpose of allowing secondary
liability to apply in this context is to force a registrar to act in order to protect
itself from liability. Such action, however, is what will further protect a
rightful trademark owner.
83. Changing with the cybersquatters: the evolution of brand protection,
WORLD TRADEMARK REV. BLOG (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.worldtrademark
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cybersquatting, it is necessary to broadly interpret and flexibly
apply the ACPA. Rigid interpretations, like the one employed in
Petronas, allow cybersquatters to insulate themselves from
efficient repercussions by dodging and dragging out lawsuits and
arbitration, while also allowing registrars to disclaim
responsibility of complicity in obvious cybersquatting ordeals.84
By interpreting the ACPA against the backdrop of common law
vicarious liability principles, in the same way courts have
interpreted trademark infringement under the Lanham Act,
courts can effectively deter registrars from turning a blind eye to
cybersquatting and allow trademark holders to obtain relief from
those who hold the greatest amount of control over domain
names, and who are in the best position to prevent it from the
outset, given only a small amount of oversight.85 Allowing
contributory liability actions against domain name registrars also
offers greater potential for the actual recovery of damages where
harm to a mark is done, and targets litigation against parties who
will be more willing to quickly take down infringing names in an
efficient manner.86 Thus, the potential for contributory liability is
likely to have the effect of reducing litigation, rather than
increasing it, and promoting efficient internet commerce. Because
of this effect, courts can fulfill the goals of the statute while
staying within its powers to interpret it. Accordingly, if and when
another case reaches the Supreme Court, the Court should follow
the rationale of its prior decision in Inwood and firmly establish
an action for contributory liability under the ACPA.87

review.com/log/detail.aspx?g=5d4d92f6-5a20-4779-9e7b-0cd1afa1ad8e.
84. See Petronas, 737 F.3d at 550; Brenda R. Sharton, Domain Name
Disputes: To Sue or Not To Sue, BOS. B.J., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 10 (for the
proposition that ACPA “include[s] traditional claims of trademark
infringement”).
85. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854–55
(1982).
86. See Changing with the cybersquatters: the evolution of brand
protection, supra note 83 (for the proposition that it can be very difficult to
locate and pinpoint the exact registrant responsible for cybersquatting
because of the international reach of the internet and sophisticated tactics
used to dodge liability).
87. See 456 U.S. at 854–55.

